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 Alternatives to the “Race to
the Bottom” in Vietnam
Minimum Wage Strikes and
Their Aftermath
Angie Ngoc Tran
California State University at Monterey Bay
This case study focuses on strategic mediating roles of labor newspapers. Concentrat-
ing on minimum wage strikes from 2005 to 2006, it shows the state’s pro-foreign direct
investment policy, tensions between state bureaucracies and labor unions, and their
debates. It demonstrates alternatives to the “race to the bottom” thesis. The larger
implication is that labor organizing and spontaneous collective actions can be success-
ful even within a one-party state. It remains to be seen how the new strike law ratified
in 2006 addresses structural weaknesses of the labor unions and the state, and how it
affects labor organizing for workers’ rights and interests.
Compelling evidence demonstrates that the “race to the bottom” is not inevitableand that spontaneous labor organizing in Vietnam is effecting positive changes
on workers’ behalf. The minimum wage strike wave, which started at the end of
December 2005 and intensified in January 2006, resulted in a victory, with a long-
overdue 40 percent increase in the minimum wage in foreign-invested companies,
after being frozen for ten years. The increase affected workers’ monthly wages at all
three general work locations in Vietnam: higher for cities (870,000 VND
[Vietnamese d-ong] or US$54), lower for provinces (790,000 VND or US$49), and
lowest for rural areas (710,000 VND or US$44).
This article provides a concrete case study on the mediating roles of the labor
newspapers, which triggered concrete responses from the labor unions and the state
(Tran 2007). Focusing on the minimum wage strikes, I chronicle the historical con-
text to show the policy of the state favoring foreign direct investment (FDI), the key
events leading up to the minimum wage strikes and their aftermath, and especially
Author’s Note: I would like to thank many Vietnamese journalists, workers, labor union representatives,
state officials, and the international NGO community who shared information, insights, and wisdom. This
article is dedicated to workers, whose agency and courage never cease to inspire my work.
 the tensions between state bureaucracies and the labor unions and their debates in
2005. I present how the strikes were largely successful, starting from workers’ spon-
taneous strikes, which triggered labor newspapers’ actions to influence responses
from the labor unions and the state at both local and central levels. The larger impli-
cation of this case study is that labor organizing and mostly spontaneous collective
action, warranted by the political economic climate of 2006 (before Vietnam joined
the World Trade Organization), can still be successful even within the context of a
one-party state in a globalized environment. I argue that labor unions, empowered by
their dynamic pro-labor newspapers, can respond positively and effectively to work-
ers’ plights.
Context for the Minimum Wage Issue: The Vietnamese General
Confederation of Labor, the State, and Foreign Capital
The history and context of the minimum wage debates set the stage for successful
strikes in December 2005 to increase the minimum wage in FDI companies.
Vietnam’s pro-FDI policy, dating back to 1999, influenced the behaviors of key stake-
holders: the two ministries of Labor and Finance, the Vietnamese General
Confederation of Labor (VGCL), and the FDI community. Within the pro-FDI con-
text, the policy of the Vietnamese Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs
(MOLISA) created a wage structure that benefited capital more than labor. According
to Decision 708, FDI workers were paid in Vietnamese d-ong (VND) instead of U.S.
dollars (USD), based on the exchange rate set by MOLISA, 13,910 VND per USD.
Consequently, the highest minimum wage of $45 USD in big cities was equivalent to
625,950 VND. In suburban areas, such as Binh Duong and Dong Nai, workers
received an even lower monthly wage: 556,000 VND (about $40 USD). However, for
seven years (1999 to the end of 2005), even when the VND was devalued 15 percent,
(from 13,900 to 16,000 VND/USD), MOLISA failed to adjust this minimum wage in
VND.1 Taking advantage of this inertia, global suppliers/managers still paid city
workers the same wage in VND, irrespective of this devaluation. Therefore, as of
2005, if one used the devalued exchange rate, workers actually brought home only
$39 USD per month, which, according to the International Labor Organization (ILO),
is one of the lowest minimum wages in the world, even lower than Cambodia’s and
China’s (according to the Laborer, a union newspaper in Ho Chi Minh City,
December 29, 2005, and confirmed in phone interviews with Laborer journalist Le in
2005). Moreover, on October 1, 2005, a 21 percent increase in the minimum wage for
workers in the state sector (from 290,000 to 350,000 VND) had heightened the expec-
tations of FDI workers to receive their minimum wage increase also.
Charged by the prime minister to draft the minimum wage increase, MOLISA
consulted with the VGCL and the business community nationwide in 2005. Using
the forums of the Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) in the last
quarter of 2005, MOLISA obtained perspectives from the business community on
 the minimum wage increase, in particular, chambers of commerce from the United
States, Europe, Taiwan, and South Korea. The chronology in Appendix A shows key
events leading to the minimum wage strikes and their aftermath. Three general pat-
terns emerged: the pro-labor perspective of VGCL that proposed a 40 percent mini-
mum wage increase (from the 626,000 VND since 1999 to 870,000 VND); the
pro-FDI tendency of MOLISA, Finance Ministry, VCCI, and FDI community that
proposed a smaller 26 percent increase (from 626,000 VND to 790,000 VND). The
third perspective reflects local concerns that were most impacted: Ho Chi Minh City
(HCMC) People’s Committee and Labor Federation who argued for a 40 percent
increase to compensate for the inflation rate and the VND devaluation. (This infor-
mation was published by the VCCI Forum, January 5, 2006.)
The fight over raising the minimum wage in the FDI sector was not “if” but
“when” and what would be the levels of the raise. The negotiations between the
VGCL and MOLISA (in alliance with the VCCI and FDI community) to influence
the prime minister’s decision on the starting date of the minimum wage hike resulted
in two plans being proposed in November 2005. The prime minister’s delay in
announcing his decision created an atmosphere of uncertainty that management took
advantage of. MOLISA (as the principal player in charge of this task) proposed two
plans to the prime minister: Plan A would raise the minimum wage based on the
actual wage paid by FDI companies and the equilibrium wage in the labor market
(the three-tiered structure for city/suburb/rural areas respectively: 870,000 VND;
790,000 VND; 710,000 VND); Plan B would raise the minimum wage less, accord-
ing to an increase in the cost-of-living index: 790,000; 710,000; 630,000.
(Information was found at VnExpress.net December 26, 2005, and the VCCI Forum
in 2006). Le Xuan Thanh (2004), MOLISA vice director of wages and salaries, said
that the prime minister still had not decided what proposal to adopt as of December
26, 2005. Thanh attributed this delay to several FDI companies who had lobbied the
prime minister to push back the effective date so they had more time to prepare their
2006 financial plans based on calculations of input costs.
What unfolded in the days before the onset of the strikes reflected the divide
between a pro-labor group (VGCL) and a pro-FDI group (MOLISA and other relevant
ministries), as well as the powerful role of the HCMC People’s Committee (govern-
ment), the HCMC Labor Federation, and the HCMC Export Processing and Industrial
Zones Authority (HEPZA). Also, the joint resolution of the MOLISA minister and the
former VGCL president (discussed below) provides insights into this tension. Before
the massive wave of minimum wage protests, a management-advocate newspaper pub-
lished by the VCCI noted that the Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Finance, and the
VCCI, together with a majority of foreign investors in the FDI community, gravitated
toward Plan B (raising minimum wage to only 790,000), because, according to the
VCCI Forum, “it is more optimal than Plan A” (which would raise the minimum wage
to 870,000).2 Representing a vital local interest, Nguyen Thien Nhan (then vice chair-
man of HCMC People’s Committee) argued that the real wage should take into con-
sideration an increase in the inflation rate (28 percent) and the devaluation of the
 Vietnamese currency (relative to U.S. dollars) of 14 percent, since workers receive
Vietnamese d-ong and not U.S. dollars. These two aspects added up to 42 percent which
may explain the 40 percent minimum wage hike pushed forward by HCMC Labor
Federation.
The ambivalence of the state, seen through the hesitation of the prime minister in
announcing the effective date for the minimum wage increase, reflects the dilemmas
of a socialist state integrating into the global market economy: wanting to promote
FDI policy, and also having to deal with structural changes in the state sector. On
January 4, 2006, Dang Ngoc Chien (vice-president of the VGCL who worked with
the MOLISA unit charged by the prime minister to propose plans for minimum wage
increase in FDI companies) attributed the delay in raising the minimum wage to a
pro-FDI policy: “The state ministries were afraid that such increase might affect the
policy to attract FDI into Vietnam.” Moreover, there is another form of inertia: eco-
nomic restructuring problems in socialist Vietnam. Raising it in the FDI sector
would create pressure to raise the minimum wage throughout the state sector, which
includes both civil servants and state workers. This may have added to the indeci-
siveness of the prime minister’s decision: according to Thanh, Salary and Wages
Department, MOLISA, “The delay was also due to the big gap between minimum
wage in the state sector and the FDI sector.” Moreover, the financial implication
means a higher state contribution to social security and health care based on higher
minimum wage for all pensioners. MOLISA already announced the road map to
arrive at one common minimum wage for all sectors by 2010 to accommodate struc-
tural changes in the state sector’s employment.
Would raising the minimum wage really help workers? That question opens many
other issues that show the tension between the state and the VGCL. From a state per-
spective, more efficient negotiations and bargaining skills of labor unions and work-
ers rather than raising the minimum wage would improve workers’ conditions. For
instance, Thanh (as reported in the VCCI Forum) slightly nudged the VGCL to
strengthen its ineffective enterprise labor unions in negotiations with FDI manage-
ment (see Tran 2007 for VGCL structural weaknesses): “The government always
encouraged FDI companies to pay higher than the minimum wage, and this effort
relies on the role of enterprise-level labor unions to bargain with FDI management.”
Fighting for a living wage, rather than the rock-bottom minimum wage, is another
state perspective critical of the VGCL leadership role.
Role of East Asian Capital
To understand the significance of East Asian factories in strikes, one needs to
understand the structure of FDI in Vietnam. Foreign capital began entering Vietnam
most notably after 1986, when Vietnam formally engaged in the market system.3
East Asian investors expanded first to China and then to Vietnam as global suppliers
for Western retailers in flexible global production discussed in the “Third Sleeve”
 article (Tran 2007). The top five investors in Vietnam as of mid-2006 are from East
Asia: Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong (as reported in the
Laborer in January of 2005 and a Ministry of Planning and Investment [MPI] report
of 2006).4 These investors manufacture a wide range of products such as textile/gar-
ment, electronics, leather/shoes, household, mechanics, wood, service, and jewelry.
But in labor-intensive industries such as garment/textile and footwear manufactur-
ing, most FDI ventures come from Taiwan and South Korea, and most of their fac-
tories concentrate in the south of Vietnam (Norlund 2004; also found in an MPI
Report of 2006).
To be sure, labor dissatisfaction and industrial conflicts occurred in both FDI and
Vietnamese factories under flexible production.5 However, it is not only that protests
in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are subtle and implicit; there is also a sense of
“political correctness” when focusing on foreign enterprises, because they “repre-
sent the capital that only recently had been viewed as dangerous and exploitative”
(Norlund 2004, 126).
As shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3, most strikes occur in companies with foreign
capital and management, especially from Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong, and
in southern industrialized provinces, such as HCMC, Binh Duong, and Dong Nai.
Figure 1 focuses on strikes by ownership types. Most reported strikes occurred in the
FDI sector; this can be explained by the shrinking number of SOEs (being privatized
or “equitized”) and increasing numbers of FDI companies. To be sure, state workers
do protest, but labor disputes in SOEs, rather than open strikes, take the forms of
petitions and complaint letters sent to local labor newspapers, local departments of
MOLISA, and district labor unions (Phone interviews with Le, Laborer journalist,
June 2005.) Since strikes were legalized in 1995, over twelve hundred strikes have
erupted as of this writing. While there is a discrepancy on the number of strikes from
different sources, which may be because of different ways in which strikes are
defined, most sources agree on two points: (1) most reported strikes occurred in the
FDI sector; (2) most strikes were spontaneous and without labor union leadership.6
Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of strikes. Most FDI factories are con-
centrated in the south of Vietnam, especially HCMC and industrial provinces such
as Binh Duong and Dong Nai, and much less so in the north. Figure 3 focuses on
nationality of capital (where FDI comes from), which is significant because most
FDI companies in HEPZA are from East Asia, namely Taiwan, South Korea, Hong
Kong, Japan, and Singapore. The strike that sparked the wave of strikes demanding
a minimum wage increase in December 2005 occurred in Freetrend Industrial, a 100
percent Taiwanese leather/shoe company.
The Case of Freetrend Minimum Wage Strikes
To what extent did these wildcat strikes have organization and leadership? Who
were the strikers? How did the HCMC Labor Federation, HEPZA, and enterprise
 labor unions respond to workers’ strikes? How did the state respond? What was the
role of labor newspapers? To answer these questions, I focus on the first minimum
wage strike, which was sparked in Freetrend Industrial, a Taiwanese supplier for
Nike and Adidas, in one of the premier export processing zones (EPZs) in HCMC:
the Linh Trung I EPZ. (See Appendix B for photographs.)
Relatively high labor unionization rates and some financial independence of
enterprise labor unions in Freetrend do not necessarily mean that workers’ rights and
interests are safeguarded on the factory floor. For their own production stability
interests, Freetrend’s management offers labor contracts, and participates in social
and health insurance programs to maintain a steady supply of workers for continu-
ous production. They allow enterprise unionization: 68 percent unionization in 2004
(16,185 union members out of a total workforce of 23,730, according to the Laborer,
March 2004). Having three full-time union representatives, paid by membership
fees, is not adequate to interact with over 23,000 workers, much less efficient in
standing up to management to fight for their workers’ interests. Many migrant work-
ers at Freetrend complained that they had never met these three union representatives
while working there for years. For instance, when line leaders from management
side hit workers who made mistakes with the shoes they assembled, those three labor
union representatives did not intervene (correspondence with Ms. Hong, a Laborer
journalist, August 2006).
From the workers’ perspective, their collective action did not happen overnight
but was gradually aggravated by a series of unfulfilled promises made by foreign
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Figure 1
Strikes by Ownership Types
Source: Data from the Legal Department of the Vietnamese General Confederation of Labor.
 management. In the case of Freetrend, when workers witnessed a 21 percent increase
in the minimum wage of state workers starting in October 2005,7 they spontaneously
demanded that management match that raise, to which they received a management
promise of a 30 percent minimum wage increase effective in November 2005. In
December 2005, they received a fixed raise of only 100,000 VND per person/month
(about $6.25 USD), less than state workers who received a 21 percent increase in
their minimum wage starting October 1, 2005. Only after a massive number of work-
ers went on strike did Freetrend’s management agree to raise skilled workers’ wage
by 220,000 VND per month and trainees by 162,000 VND per month. Still, this raise
of about 25 percent was less than the 30 percent raise that Freetrend’s management
promised back in 2005 (according to the Laborer, December 28, 2005).
Then came the biggest strike that sparked the minimum wage strike waves in
December 2005. The outcome was an unprecedented strike of eighteen thousand
workers, the highest number at the time of writing, which showed workers’ self-
organizing power and discipline. Workers gained a 40 percent increase in the mini-
mum wage which had been frozen for the past ten years (1996–2005). The three new
levels of the minimum wage are 870,000 VND (about $54 USD), 790,000 VND ($49
USD), and 710,000 VND ($44 USD). No violent outbursts occurred: strikers stopped
working and sat in front of the factory in Linh Trung I EPZ. Workers out of despera-
tion went on strike against foreign management, a more “politically correct” target to
achieve a raise, rather than striking against the government, whose crackdowns on
dissenters provide a credible deterrence. On the common question of whether the
government was behind these strikes, no evidence can be found, plus it is not in the
pro-FDI government’s interest to disrupt their relations with the FDI community.
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Strikes by Industrialized Provinces in the South and other Places
Source: Data from the Legal Department of the Vietnamese General Confederation of Labor.
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The minimum wage strikes ran for ten days (from December 28, 2005 to January
7, 2006) with fourteen large and small work stoppages, involving a total of about
42,000 workers (in three FDI companies), pushing the state to raise the minimum
wage levels by 40 percent in FDI companies effective February 1, 2006. The first
three massive spontaneous work stoppages took place in three nearby FDI factories
in Linh Trung EPZ, (according to the Laborer, December 2005); then this wave
spread to other FDI factories. The first spark was on December 28 in Freetrend
Industrial with eighteen thousand strikers; then on December 29 and 30 it spread to
Kollan company (South Korean–owned; see Appendix B) with four thousand strik-
ers, and then Hugo (South Korean–owned) with one thousand strikers. Note that the
new rates are intended for low-skilled workers only; workers who had on-the-job
training were to receive at least 7 percent higher than those minimum wages. (This
information was found in Prime Minister Decree No. 3/2006/ND-CP, and in the
Laborer in February 2006.)
Most Freetrend strikers were migrant workers from the north and central
provinces; while no labor organizer officially emerged from this huge crowd, they
were effective in labor organizing. This provides evidence of the creation of new
working classes, that is, migrant workers, producing strong labor movements in these
new sites of flexible production (Tran 2007). According to some Laborer journalists
who witnessed the strike scenes and did follow-up reports, the workers collectively
Figure 3
Strikes by Type of East Asian Capital
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 made a very strategic and wise decision, since they knew that if they acted as a
group, management would be unable to identify the strike leaders and suppress
them. These journalists found that the strikers had accumulated years of discontent
and frustration with the substandard pay and working conditions; thus as soon as
some activist workers secretly suggested work stoppage, although many workers had
no idea who the initiators were, they followed suit spontaneously (interviews and
correspondence with Laborer journalists Le, Hong, Pham, and Nguyen in July,
August, and September 2006).
What would be the roles of the labor unions and the state in setting up a frame-
work to cope with this development? All three levels of labor organizations—the
HCMC Labor Federation, the HEPZA labor unions, and Freetrend labor unions—
became involved to resolve this unprecedented huge strike. At the height of the
Freetrend strike, Lieu Quang Vinh, the chairman of Freetrend labor unions, pleaded
with workers not to engage in violence. Workers agreed, but they pressured him to
negotiate on their behalf: “We believe you, but with such low wages, how can we
survive? Why don’t you do the math for us: with only several hundreds of thousands
VND per month [less than $60 USD], how can we survive? Why don’t you come in
to negotiate with management on our behalf and we wait outside?” Vinh’s voice
trembled when he pleaded “Please do not destroy the factory.” Then he joined the
labor union representatives from HEPZA and HCMC Labor Federation, and local
state officials (from the Department of Labor in HCMC and the HCMC People’s
Committee) in a closed-door meeting. The strike leaders were not present in that
meeting. Consequently, eighteen thousand Freetrend workers kept their promise and
did not resort to violence. This workers’ discipline facilitated the negotiations and
resulted in Freetrend management’s promise to raise and adjust wages to compen-
sate for rising inflation rates and increased costs of living (account reported by the
Laborer on January 17, 2006).
Local state officials’ motivations were not immediately pro-labor. At the begin-
ning, local state bureaucracies, the HCMC People’s Committee, and HEPZA man-
agement blamed labor newspaper reports for instigating and spreading the strikes.
One explanation for this reaction is that the local state was responding to strong pres-
sure from the business/management side, such as Amcham, Eurocham, VCCI, other
East Asian chambers of commerce (as revealed in a joint Chambers of Commerce
letter of January 11, 2006). However, when pushed by the labor press, they did inter-
vene. All personnel of the HEPZA management team and HEPZA Labor Union
spent the night in the Freetrend factory’s vicinity to calm both management and
workers and to respond to any exigencies. The HCMC People’s Committee,
DOLISA, and the police force were also there to resolve the conflict. They advised
workers to be calm and to wait for the government to raise the minimum wage in
FDI companies. As soon as the HCMC People’s Committee sent the communiqué to
the prime minister to confirm the severity of these massive strikes, the prime minis-
ter responded immediately on the side of the workers in a struggle against FDI com-
panies. This prompt response indicates the central state’s fear of possible political
 upheaval as a by-product of industrial conflicts in a strategic city such as HCMC
where problems (economic, social, and political) would ripple throughout the coun-
try. (This information was obtained from an interview with Laborer reporter, Ms. Le,
March 2006.)
Steering Wheels for Workers: The Role of Labor
Newspapers in Minimum Wage Decision
“Taking on the steering wheels for workers,” as aptly expressed by a VGCL offi-
cial, the labor newspapers acted as an advocate for workers by exposing these
strikes in a matter of hours (as Tran Van Ly revealed in an interview in August
2006). These accounts then pushed the HCMC People’s Committee and DOLISA
to act, criticized MOLISA for their indecision in labor policy, and ultimately pres-
sured the prime minister to arrive at a concrete decision in response to workers’
requests (see chronology, Appendix A). During the whole strike period, HCMC
Labor Federation and the HEPZA Labor Union distributed the key labor newspaper
in southern Vietnam, the Laborer, for free to tens of thousands of workers in the
Linh Trung I EPZ. See photograph in Appendix B titled “Dana Vina Workers read-
ing complimentary Laborer newspapers.”)
The Laborer and an allied newspaper Labor exposed these strikes promptly as
they occurred while clearly announcing the pro-labor position of HCMC Labor
Federation (see chronology, Appendix A). Several hours after the first spark, the
Laborer had same-day coverage of the strike in Freetrend on December 28, 2005.
Then, one day after the first three strikes, on December 29, 2005, two very impor-
tant articles appeared in the Laborer. “Wait until When?” was the first and it 
criticized MOLISA on their minimum wage policy, which tends to promote man-
agement’s interests rather than those of workers. In this on-the-spot coverage of the
strikes, the journalists openly critiqued MOLISA for kowtowing to foreign capital:
“Continuing to postpone the increase in the minimum wage in FDI companies, it
seems that MOLISA had ‘favored’ FDI companies too much at the expense of mil-
lions of workers who were anxiously waiting every day for this increase to improve
their hard and struggling lives. Workers will have to wait until when?” “Increasing
the Minimum Wage in FDI Companies: We Can Wait No Longer!” was the sec-
ond piece in which the Laborer estimated the accumulated costs of the seven-
year consequences of MOLISA Decision 708 on Vietnamese workers in FDI
companies in terms of lost wages and social security benefits to the tune of about
$430 million USD.
Interestingly, evidence shows that the labor press, consisting of two key labor
newspapers, supported each other during these strikes. They took turns “taking the
heat” and pressuring both the local government and central bureaucracy to respond
 to workers’ requests. When the Laborer was criticized by the HCMC People’s
Committee and MOLISA as being an “instigator,” the Labor joined in by reporting
those strikes, which had now spread to other FDI factories in the south, beyond
Freetrend Industrial. The Labor could do so because it had no direct political con-
straints, since it is not under the “jurisdiction” of HCMC People’s Committee
(according to Le, Laborer journalist, August 2006) (see chronology, Appendix A).
While events back then gave hope for an arguably emerging “autonomous” labor
press, the lack of reports on crackdowns on several workers, who allegedly belonged
to a non-VGCL labor union, in November 2006 shows the limit to labor newspaper
coverage, especially when power of the state and the VGCL are at stake. More in-
depth research is needed on this issue.
Arguably, back then the newspaper arm helped the VGCL to be a relatively more
autonomous body vis-à-vis the state bureaucracy to represent workers’ rights and
interests. These timely reports made public the viewpoints of the top VGCL
leadership at the most critical time, which helped workers’ collective action (see
chronology, Appendix A). First, they forced the top leadership of the VGCL and
MOLISA to respond to overwhelming workers’ demand. Two days after these two
important articles, Cu Thi Hau (then president of the VGCL) worked with Nguyen
Thi Hang (minister of MOLISA) on a joint resolution, which was submitted to the
prime minister on December 31, 2005. This resolution confirms those articles’ argu-
ments about the pro-FDI tendency of MOLISA, the power of spontaneous workers’
strikes, and the effectiveness of the labor press in timely response to these strikes. It
proposed Plan A (the higher three-tiered wage structure) and recommended January
1, 2006, as the starting date of the minimum wage hike instead of four months later,
April 1, 2006, as proposed by MOLISA. It reiterated the real life conditions that
necessitated a 40 percent increase in minimum wage in FDI companies, consistent
with the HCMC People’s Committee’s perspective.
A January 2006 Labor interview with then-VGCL leader Cu Thi Hau clearly indi-
cated tensions between MOLISA and the VGCL. As soon as spontaneous strikes
erupted in FDI companies, Cu met with the MOLISA minister on December 31,
2005, and January 1, 2006, to unify their positions about the minimum wage hike (in
both timeframe and amount). In general, she supported the workers’ demand: “While
the strike procedure was not legal, workers’ request was legitimate,” and was very
attentive to the timely needs of migrant workers: “The VGCL considered that strikes
in FDI factories to raise the minimum wage are legitimate. So, we need to urgently
resolve this wage increase for workers; if not, sympathetic strikes (dinh cong day
chuyen) would become even more serious, especially in the most sensitive time near
Tet [the Vietnamese Lunar New Year often occurs in February] when workers get
ready to return home with their families.”
She was outspoken about the delayed actions of state bureaucracy, notably
MOLISA, which was charged to advise the prime minister on a road map for mini-
mum wage increase:
 
 In reality, in the last several years, the VGCL had proposed to the Prime Minister many
times about the need to raise the minimum wage in the FDI sector. Specifically, in 2004,
this minimum wage increase was one of the ten major recommendations we put forward
to the Prime Minister who charged MOLISA to lead the effort to plan for this increase.
Again in November 2005, the VGCL continued to reiterate this minimum-wage recom-
mendation to the Prime Minister [Phan Van Khai at that time] which prompted him to
issue a formal Decision [December 8, 2005] to push MOLISA to work with the VGCL
and other relevant ministries to come up with concrete recommendation.
On coordination between the VGCL and relevant state bureaucracies, she said:
“. . . the extreme delay of state bureaucracy in consultation with the Prime Minister
had resulted in these massive strikes. I think the need to respect and genuinely listen
to recommendations from the VGCL are key lessons to improve the coordination
between VGCL and state bureaucracies” (reported in Labor, January 2006).
From the local state perspective, after having read the Laborer reports, Nguyen
Thien Nhan, then vice-president of the HCMC People’s Committee, visited these
strikes, and on the following day sent a communiqué to the prime minister request-
ing his response to these strikes (January 4, 2006). On January 6, 2006, the prime
minister formally signed Decision 03 to raise the minimum wage in FDI companies,
which took effect in February 2006.
From management’s perspective, given the pro-FDI position of MOLISA and the
state’s indecisiveness in announcing the effective date, there might have been gen-
uine confusion among some international members about the timing of the minimum
wage increase in the FDI sector and the percentage increase. (This information was
gathered from interviews with representatives from FES, Yujin-Kreves Company,
Global Standards, MAST industries Far East Ltd., August 2006.) On January 11,
2006, a letter from the Joint Chambers of Commerce claimed to have expected a
minimum wage increase to take place in April 2006 and not February 2006
(MOLISA’s original position), and also contended that there was inadequate consul-
tation with them, for which they claimed to be unprepared. Thanks to workers’ spon-
taneous collective action that led to MOLISA’s change in tone about the minimum
wage issue, its formal response on January 27, 2006, to that criticism clearly showed
the pro-labor position and implied that mistakes were made by management in most
cases: “The occurred pay disputes have shown that some issues in relation to labour
such as salary or salary scale, labour norms, labour conditions, working time and
relaxation time, etc., haven’t been carried out completely and unanimously in accor-
dance with the regulations of Labour Legislation.” Moreover, Nguyen Manh Cuong,
Director of International Relations Department, and Nguyen Thi Dan, Director of
the Wages and Salaries Department of DOLISA in HCMC, expressed doubts about
these management criticisms during interviews in August 2006: “Management
understands the complex ramifications of the raise and they would benefit from a
delayed state announcement on the effective date; however, workers cannot wait any
longer and fully expected some raises, therefore they went on strike.”
 Aftermath of Minimum Wage Strikes: Reactions of 
Local State and Newspapers
The reactions of local state and labor press to expedite the implementation of this
decree were extremely fast. The local state response was relatively pro-labor, in
recognition of the lack of effective enterprise labor unions. The HCMC People’s
Committee allowed some workers’ representation at the negotiating table with other
stakeholders in nonunionized factories. On March 6, 2006, the vice-president of
HCMC People’s Committee signed Ordinance 35, Decision on Protocol for coordi-
nation and preliminary resolution of wildcard strikes in HCMC. This protocol,
enforced only in HCMC, charges district/ward people’s committees to form a group
of state officials who temporarily represent workers in nonunionized factories until
the immediate higher-level VGCL labor unions (such as district level) establish offi-
cial enterprise labor unions (according to Nguyen Thi Dan during an interview in
July 2006). With the revised Chapter 14 on strikes, a nationwide ordinance will be
issued to guide its implementation in July 2007.
These quick reactions of local state and labor press show conscious efforts are
being made to address weaknesses in implementing labor policies. Response came
in only five days compared with the months that had been common practice.
Moreover, the labor press was very effective in preempting potential management
evasions of the law to protect workers’ rights and interests. On January 11, 2006,
only five days after the issuance of the Prime Minister’s Decree No. 03 on January
6, 2006, MOLISA issued a formal Ordinance No. 120 to instruct all local state
bureaucracies and labor unions (including HEPZA) to properly implement the Prime
Minister’s Decree, as well as all state media to disseminate these decisions and
instructions to ensure management compliance.
On the same day, a Laborer journalist interviewed a key representative from the
Department of Labor (in HCMC) and reported key issues to ensure that workers got
paid properly according to their skill levels (skilled workers should receive higher
than the rock-bottom minimum wage), and to preempt management from finding
ways to evade this minimum wage hike. For instance, companies are not permitted
to cut social security and health benefits to compensate for a minimum wage hike,
and companies have to be transparent and post information about salary levels and
raises. Moreover, these labor newspapers continue to be a forum for workers’ requests.
For instance, the “Counseling on Labor Laws” section presents direct dialogues
between workers and management. As exposed in a query entitled: “Adjusting wages
according to the new minimum wage law,” a worker in a joint venture in HCMC
questioned why she did not receive an increase in minimum wage even after the new
law went into effect in February 2006, to which the personnel director promised to
consult with local labor agencies to resolve her complaint (as reported in the Laborer
in March of 2006).
 Challenged by the strikes, the VGCL accepted its own structural weakness and
supported some temporary forms of workers’ representation in nonunionized 
factories. But it still wants to preserve its monopolistic power on worker–
management relations. Conscious efforts have been made by the VGCL leaders to
better connect with local labor unions, to improve their budget for greater union
activities, and to alleviate some inequity arising from pro-FDI policy.8 They come
down to meet and listen to local labor unions in southern strike-prone areas and
use their pragmatic solutions to address VGCL structural weaknesses on workers’
behalf.
Implications of the New Strike Law
News coverage of National Assembly debates since 2005 demonstrates important
tendencies of frank and open perspectives from local state, and labor unions, espe-
cially from strike-prone provinces and cities in the south (according to the Laborer,
August 11, 2006 and Vietnam News, August 2006). The failure of the strike protocol
(Chapter 14) in the Labor Code passed in 1995 deeming all strikes illegal led to
many VGCL and MOLISA debates since 2005 for the November 2006 revision.
These debates reflected progressive and pro-labor viewpoints of delegates from
strike-prone provinces such as Dong Nai, Binh Duong, Binh Phuoc, Kontum, and
HCMC. Most supported the workers’ right to strike and their right to representation
in nonunionized factories. The November 2006 revision of Chapter 14 (strikes) in
the Labor Code reflects a tremendous effort to address the weakness of the VGCL at
the enterprise level and the lack of state arbitrators/mediators. Also, while trying to
balance different interests, these clear procedures directly address the weakness of
the previous strike law, which contributed to thousands of wildcat strikes.
At this writing, only textual analysis can be done, since this new strike law does
not go into effect until July 1, 2007. This new law represents some compromises
among three main interests: VGCL, state, and FDI community. While the strike pro-
tocols are more streamlined and clearly defined with time limits, they underscore the
role of labor unions and local state in leading strikes. It remains to be seen how the
new strike law addresses the weakness of the enterprise-level reconciliation com-
mittee (because of enterprise unions’ salaries being paid by management and state
mediators being few and far between (interview with Ms. Nguyen, Director of the
Wages Department of HCMC Department of Labor, July 2006). The main thrust
seems to be the establishment of arbitration committees beyond the enterprises to
preempt strikes in nonunionized factories. At least in principle, this new law does not
rely on the enterprise labor unions (considering their weakness) to arbitrate with
management when there are labor violations.
On the right to strike and workers’ representation, while allowing workers the
right to organize, even in nonunionized factories, the VGCL underscores their role
 in leading strikes. Two protocols with clearly defined roles of local state and labor
unions indicate the official position of not recognizing any independent form of
labor organizing, sustaining their power grip on labor–capital relations and desire for
political stability.9 Recall the nationwide debates from 2004 to 2006 on sensitive
issues of what to do with spontaneous labor organizing and strikes in companies
without unions or with ineffective enterprise labor unions; several outspoken dele-
gates in strike-prone provinces throughout Vietnam even expressed doubts about
VGCL effectiveness.10 Some even suggested temporary recognition of some forms
of independent labor representation, not within the purview of the VGCL.11
Clearly, compromises had been made to appease the FDI community on workers’
right to strike. The connections between types of disputes (rights-based or interest-
based) and the right to strike are very significant to workers, because when basic
wages are not livable (a reality), other allowances become vital to their survival. This
new law clearly distinguishes between disputes on rights (violations of basic stipula-
tions on wages, work hours, overtime hours, and compensation, stated in the collec-
tive bargaining agreements) and disputes on interests (violations of allowances such
as raises, bonuses, social security, health and unemployment benefits, beyond collec-
tive bargaining agreements). Thus, it rejected the progressive position of some out-
spoken southern delegates on the inseparability of rights and interests.12
The protocol for group disputes (rather than individual disputes, which are sepa-
rate in Chapter 14) indicates that it is more difficult to strike on rights-based disputes,
with the labor/people court designated to be the last resort.13 By institutionalizing sev-
eral key committees, the new strike protocol tends to embolden the roles of local
state agencies and labor unions and to curtail spontaneous strikes. It requires the for-
mation of enterprise-level reconciliation committees (hoi dong hoa giai co so) in fac-
tories that do have enterprise labor unions or provisionary labor union executive
committees (ban chap hanh cong doan lam thoi).14 The key difference is to ensure
an equal number of representatives from both sides (labor and management) on 
this committee. In case this committee cannot be formed, a local labor arbitrator/
mediator (hoa giai vien lao dong), appointed by the local department of the Ministry
of Labor at the city/provincial level, will arbitrate the conflict. At the city level, a
labor arbitration committee (hoi dong trong tai lao dong), established by the local
people’s committees, is responsible for resolving the factory-level conflicts. It con-
sists of representatives from the local labor federation, the local department of
Ministry of Labor, management, and labor relations experts.
The two sets of protocols for dispute resolution, one rights-based and the other
interests-based, clearly define the timeframe, relevant arbitration committees, and
their responsibilities. For the rights-based dispute protocol, local state leads the
effort: within five working days after the receipt of letter of complaints, the chair-
man of the people’s committee (in the affected area) calls for a meeting consisting
of representatives from all sides. They include members serving on the enterprise-
level reconciliation committee (if nonexistent, a local labor arbitrator is needed),
 immediate higher-level of labor unions and other relevant agencies (if needed), and
the last resort is the people’s court at city/provincial level. If the time limit runs out
when the dispute is still not resolved after having exhausted all the above channels,
then workers can proceed to strike. For the interests-based dispute protocol, a more
broad-based labor committee leads the charge: within seven working days after the
receipt of letter of complaints, the labor arbitration committee calls for a meeting
consisting of representatives from all sides. They include members serving on the
enterprise-level reconciliation committee (if nonexistent, a local labor arbitrator is
needed) and immediate higher-level of labor unions and other relevant agencies (if
needed). If the time limit runs out when both sides are still not satisfied with the res-
olution suggested by the labor arbitration committee (or one side did not attend the
meetings) and after the meeting minutes are distributed to all sides within one day,
then workers can proceed to strike. The strike limit is one year since the date of labor
violations.
Conclusion
This case study demonstrates that there are alternatives to the “race to the bot-
tom” thesis. To the extent permitted by the state, there is space for resistance in
Vietnam: evidence shows that migrant workers are able to organize and protest,
albeit primarily for short-term basic worker rights, against serving as “cheap labor”
for global capital in a socialist country that has to deal with ramifications from its
pro-FDI policy.
Evidence also shows that top leadership waited until some critical articles and inter-
views appeared in the Laborer before they actively responded to workers’ protests.
Acting within a permissible space, the dynamic media arm has strategically empowered
local labor unions and effectively pushed central labor unions and the state to effect pol-
icy changes on workers’ behalf: as immediate as the policy to raise the minimum wage
in January 2006, and as long-term as the new revised strike law ratified in November
2006. However, at the time of writing, crackdowns on dissenters in Vietnam plus social
consequences of the ongoing equitization process of state-owned enterprises disadvan-
taging workers necessitate further research on the limits of state tolerance for labor orga-
nizing and protests beyond the “permissible” foreign capital sector.
Appendix A
Chronology on Minimum Wage Issue and the New Strike Law
1990: The government set the minimum wage to $50 USD (U.S. dollars) per month in foreign
direct investment (FDI) companies in major cities like Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) and Hanoi.
1992: They reduced it to $35 USD, succumbing to global capital pressure. This led the
Vietnamese General Confederation of Labor (VGCL) central level to join forces with HCMC
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 Labor Federation against Vietnamese Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA)
and to demand resuming the minimum wage to $50 per month (the state-set level in 1990).
1994: When HCMC Labor Federation called for a nationwide wage hike to $50 USD per
month, MOLISA finally agreed that a wage rise in FDI companies was needed to keep pace
with inflation and to compensate for the reductions in the dollar–VND (Vietnamese d-ong)
exchange rate in 1995 (Stromseth 1998).
1996: Both sides ended in a compromise of $45 USD. The state chose the (lower) MOLISA
position, which raised it to $45 USD in Hanoi and HCMC, $40 in big cities/provinces, and $35
in other areas (Stromseth 1998).
1997: Because of the Asian financial crisis, the minimum wage was adjusted downward to
as low as $30 in poor areas (as revealed in a communiqué from Cu Thi Hau & Pham Thi Hang
to the prime minister, December 31, 2005).
1999: MOLISA issued Decision 708 to pay workers in FDI companies in VND instead of U.S.
dollars according to the exchange rate of 13,910 VND per dollar. So, the highest minimum wage
of $45 USD is equivalent to 625,950 VND. This level of minimum wage was kept for seven years
(1999 to the end of 2005), but the exchange rate had increased from 13,910 VND per dollar to
about 16,000 VND per dollar. So, in reality, the highest minimum wage level in Vietnam was not
even $40 USD, the lowest minimum wage in the world according to the International Labor
Organization (ILO) (as revealed by Ms. Le, Laborer journalist, December 2005).
2004: VGCL put forward ten major proposals to the prime minister. The minimum wage
hike in FDI companies is one of these proposals.
October 1, 2005: Minimum wage of state sector and state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
increased to 350,000 VND (from 290,000).
November 2005: The VGCL worked with Prime Minister Phan Van Khai to once again
propose the minimum wage increase.
November 2005: Two plans from MOLISA to the prime minister: Plan A adjusts minimum
wage based on the actual wage paid by FDI companies and equilibrium wage in the labor mar-
ket (870,000; 790,000; 710,000); Plan B adjusts the minimum wage according to an increase
in cost-of-living index: 790,000; 710,000; 630,000 (according to VnExpress.net December 26,
2005, and 2006 VCCI Forum).
December 8, 2005: Prime Minister Phan Van Khai issued a formal Decision to push
MOLISA to work with the VGCL and other relevant ministries to come up with concrete rec-
ommendations (as in VnExpress.net Dec 26, 2005).
December 28, 2005: Spontaneous strikes spread among three companies in Linh Trung EPZ
–HCMC: Freetrend (eighteen thousand strikers) on 12/28, Kollan (four thousand strikers), and
Hugo (one thousand strikers) on 12/29 and 12/30. From December 28 to January 7, 42,000 work-
ers participated in fourteen large and small strikes (reported in the Laborer, January 7, 2006).
December 29, 2005: The Laborer critiqued MOLISA in its article “Wait until when?”
December 29, 2005: The Labor Union page of the Laborer expressed clearly its position in
another article “Increasing the Minimum Wage in FDI companies: We Can’t Wait Any Longer!”
January 1, 2006: Cu Thi Hau (VGCL) and Nguyen Thi Hang (MOLISA) joined forces and
forwarded a communiqué to the prime minister to request a 40 percent increase in the mini-
mum wage in FDI companies.
Appendix A (continued)
 January 2, 2006: Cu Thi Hau announced that the prime minister’s office had agreed with
the resolution of VGCL and MOLISA asking for the 40 percent increase.
January 4, 2006: Nguyen Thien Nhan, vice-president of the HCMC People’s Committee,
chaired the meeting with relevant state apparatus and representatives of thirty-four companies
to find “solutions to reduce the heat of L-K conflicts.”
January 4, 2006: Dang Ngoc Chien (vice-president of the VGCL who worked with the
MOLISA unit that was charged by the prime minister to propose plans for minimum wage
increases in FDI companies) agreed that the reason for the delay in raising the minimum wage
is that “the state ministries were afraid that such increase might affect the policy to attract FDI
into VN” (reported in the VCCI Forum on 2006).
January 5, 2006: Lê Vinh Danh, vice-president of Ton Duc Thang (a labor unions univer-
sity in HCMC) opined that “from a different perspective, all these strikes had forced state
agencies responsible to make policies on wages to resolve these conflicts in more expedited
and timely manner.” Cu Thi Hau affirmed, “There is a need to resolutely resolve issues rec-
ommended by the VGCL to the Prime Minister. Not fulfilling the charge of representing and
protecting workers’ rights means that the VGCL does not fulfill its responsibilities.”
January 5, 2006: In the Sixth Conference of the Ninth Congress of the VGCL, Cu Thi Hau
earnestly requested to all labor union participants: “In the last several days, workers had
actively gone on strike to demand a raise in minimum wage. I recommend that we concentrate
on finding solutions to this problem in order to protect workers’ right.”
January 5, 2006: The role of security and police forces is heightened—a show of increas-
ing state surveillance—on the question of potential violence in strikes. Nguyen Thien Nhan
said, “If violence occurred, within ten minutes, security force will be dispatched to deal with
it. At the same time, we will use four local representatives from: the company, security forces,
state apparatus, and labor unions to deal with and prevent violence. In addition, HCMC
People’s Committee immediately requested to establish a mobile force to timely deal with
these circumstances, preventing them from going overboard.”
January 6, 2006: Decree No. 03/2006/ND-CP to raise the minimum wage levels on average
by 40 percent effective February 1, 2006, in FDI companies. The three levels (higher for big
cities and lower for provinces/rural areas) are 870,000 VND (from 626,000), 790,000 VND, and
710,000 VND. Note that these are minimum wages for low-skilled workers only, which were
frozen for the past ten years (1996–2006) (reported by the Laborer in February 2006).
January 11, 2006: Only five days later, MOLISA issued a formal Ordinance No. 120 to
instruct all local state offices (people’s committees), DOLISA, labor unions, and HEPZA to
properly implement the Prime Minister Decree No. 03 issued on January 6, 2006, and for all
forms of state media to disseminate these decisions and instructions to make sure that man-
agement has to implement these raises (reported by the Laborer, January 11, 2006).
January 11, 2006: Laborer interviewed a DOLISA representative on key issues to make
sure that workers properly get paid according to their skill levels, and to preempt management
from finding ways to evade this minimum wage hike (reported January 11, 2006).
October 1, 2006: Minimum wage in the state sector increased to 450,000 VND (from
350,000); in an effort to equalize the minimum wage between state and nonstate sectors by
2010, MOLISA intended to separate state employees in government ministries/agencies from
SOE workers by 2009 (reported by the Laborer, September 13, 2006).
November 29, 2006: The National Assembly Tenth Congress voted and issued a resolution
to revise and update Chapter 14 (on strikes) in the Labor Code, to take effect starting July 2007.
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Freetrend workers’ minimum wage strike,
Linh Trung export processing zone, Ho
Chi Minh City, December 28, 2005.
Former president of Ho Chi Minh City
export processing zone labor unions
(HEPZA) explaining wage/salary policy
to Kollan’s workers, January 2006.
Kollan workers’ minimum wage strike,
Linh Trung export processing zone, Ho
Chi Minh City, December 29, 2005.
Between-shift meals at Kollan Company
with a visit from the president of Ho Chi
Minh City Labor Federation, January 9,
2006.
 Notes
1. It is unclear whether the state benefited from this difference.
2. Of course, the meaning of “optimal” would be for the interest of capital, not of labor.
3. Legalized since the late 1980s, there are three basic types of foreign investment in Vietnam: 100
percent foreign-owned, joint ventures (foreign and Vietnamese counterparts), and commercial contracts
(a small share of the total foreign investment), according to the Ministry of Planning and Investment
(MPI), and Department of Foreign Investment, July 2004.
4. By focusing on East Asian capital, I also capture the indirect impacts of Western/American capital,
which used these East Asian companies as their global suppliers and contractors. There are direct-
invested Western European and American companies in Vietnam, but there have been few reports of labor
conflicts in these companies, a topic I discuss elsewhere.
5. I discussed elsewhere different forms of protests in state-owned enterprises (SOEs): most state
workers sent their complaint letters and petitions to labor newspapers, state offices, and labor courts.
Moreover, as SOEs are waning in the process of being “equitized,” state workers endure a lot of problems
which I discussed in another manuscript. Briefly, equitization is a process in which former SOEs sell shares
to become limited-liability companies, leading to hundreds of thousands of state workers being laid off.
6. According to statistics from the International Labor Organization (ILO) Final Report on Labor
Relations in Vietnam (2006, 11), only nine hundred strikes erupted from 1995 to 2005.
7. This 21 percent increase in their minimum wage rate amounted to 350,000 VND per month (from
290,000 VND per month). However, in state-owned factories, while receiving a very low wage, state work-
ers enjoyed other allowances such as transparent levels of raises, bonuses, and health and social benefits.
8. For instance, Dang Ngoc Tung met with local labor unions in Binh Duong and Dong Nai, two
strike-prone industrialized provinces. In particular, labor unions at the province, export processing zone
(EPZ), and enterprise levels of Binh Duong meet often to coordinate their activities. At the meeting with
Source: All images courtesy of Laborer newspaper.
Danu Vina workers (Linh Trung I EPZ
[export processing zone], Thu Duc District,
Ho Chi Minh City [HCMC]) reading com-
plimentary Laborer newspapers, distrib-
uted by the labor unions of HCMC EPZs
(HEPZA), January 6, 2006.
 
 Dang Ngoc Tung, sixty-five labor union representatives from foreign direct investment (FDI) companies
in Binh Duong showed up and proposed a change to Decision No. 53—removing the exemption that FDI
companies had been enjoying: not having to submit 2 percent of total wage funds toward labor union
activities, a practice observed by most domestic factories (in Labor, August 12, 2006). This unfair treat-
ment to domestic companies has been rectified by a recent decision of the prime minister, who requested
FDI factories to also contribute 2 percent to labor union activities (in Labor, March 7, 2007).
9. Back in 2006 however, the National Assembly Standing Committee even proposed allowing tem-
porary non-VGCL labor organizing and negotiations until “official” labor unions could be established.
For instance, a cohesive group of workers at a workplace can elect three representatives to participate in
negotiations and to organize strikes if necessary (in Laborer, September 27, 2006).
10. On the issue of the VGCL as the only organization that can lead strikes, Nguyen Thi Hong Khanh
(the southern Dong Nai province delegate) expressed her concern and posed a pointed question: “I am
very worried about assigning trade unions to organize and lead strikes . . . So would it be feasible to assign
responsibilities to an organization that had not yet led any strike?” (Since 1995, over twelve hundred
strikes had occurred that had not been organized or led by the labor unions.) She proposed that the Labor
Code should allow “other bodies to organize and lead strikes” (reported in Vietnam News, no. 5316,
August 2006). Bui Sy Loi (delegate from Thanh Hoa province) agreed with Khanh’s viewpoint and said
that the root cause of spontaneous strikes was “not only because of the Labor Code’s low feasibility, but
also the trade unions’ weakness” (reported in Vietnam News, no. 5316, August 2006) (Thanh 2004).
11. Recognizing the reality then that 85 percent of domestic private companies and about 60 percent
of FDI companies were not unionized, many delegates advocated worker representatives in negotiations
and in strike organization. For instance, Nguyen Duc Dung (Kontum, a province in the central highland),
Tran Hong Viet (Hau Giang), and Ngo Sy Huong (Thai Nguyen) recommended that the revision should
allow for worker representatives to lead strikes, in view of the absence of enterprise labor unions in most
cases which automatically make all strikes “illegal.” Furthermore, Nguyen Duc Dung analyzed: “Even in
factories that have labor unions, but not strong and often in alliance with management so they have con-
flict of interest to lead the strikes, we should allow workers to elect their representatives to lead the strikes.
If we only allowed labor unions (at enterprise and higher levels) to have legitimacy to lead strikes, then
that is not realistic nor feasible, and thus making workers, who go on strike for their legal rights, de facto
violate the laws” (reported by Vietnam News Agency, August 10, 2006). There were even proposals about
allowing workers to strike if no resolution was reached after three days (reported in Labor, August 2006.)
12. Nguyen Thi Hong Khanh (from southern Dong Nai province) recommended that the Labor Code not
distinguish between collective disputes on rights and on interests because they are interconnected as dis-
cussed earlier. Her proposal, shared by other delegates, is to maintain the workers’ right to strike as the “last
weapon” to protect their rights and benefits. Nguyen Nghiem (southern Binh Phuoc province) agreed with
that argument: “We must consider the right to strike as the basic workers’ right. Without that ‘weapon,’work-
ers do not have other ‘weapons’ (in their negotiation with management)” (reported in Laborer, August 11,
2006). Nguyen Dinh Loc of Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) agreed and added, “In reality, rights and interests
of workers are interconnected; it’s very difficult to separate these two concepts. So, if we allowed strikes in
case of interests, and outlawed strikes in case of rights, we would curtail workers’ rights” (reported in Labor
and Laborer, August 11, 2006). Tran Hong Viet (delegate from southern Hau Giang province) also agreed
that it is impossible to separate interests from rights (reported in Labor, August 11, 2006).
13 This protocol used a weak version of Hau’s argument in the previous National Assembly debates in
August 2006: “From our perspective, rights-based conflicts (when management violates stipulations in the
Labor Code) need to be resolved at the factory level. If that effort failed, then representatives of workers
have to inform state bureaucracy to investigate it. If state bureaucracy cannot resolve it satisfactorily, then
workers can stop working (ngung viec) and can bring this conflict to the labor court for resolution.”
14. However, it remains to be seen how well the enterprise reconciliation committee functions; their
past weaknesses were well recognized by many National Assembly delegates from strike-prone provinces
who recommended eliminating them.
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